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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
THE AFFIRMATIVE USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN
SUBSEQUENT CIVIL SUITS IN NEW YORK
American courts have advanced three distinct solutions to the problem of
whether the judgment of a prior criminal conviction is admissible in a subse-
quent civil proceeding based on the same facts or event. The majority rule
is that such evidence should be excluded altogether and as such cannot be
pleaded or offered in evidence in any subsequent civil action arising out of
the same facts.1 At least one jurisdiction, however, has held a judgment
of conviction not only admissible as evidence but conclusive proof as to the
commission of the act constituting the crime, thus making the matter res
judicata and leaving only the question of damages to be determined in a civil
action.2 A few jurisdictions, New York among them, hold that a prior criminal
conviction is admissible as prima facie proof of the facts involved.8 Although
this is a minority view, there is increasing support for this principle in stat-
utory recognition,4 comment by writers5 and the trend in recent case law.0
NEW YORK DECISIONS
The New York rule was first stated in 1820 in the case of Maybee v. Avery.7
In an action for slander, plaintiff alleged that the defendant had accused him
of stealing. The court held that defendant could offer evidence that the plain-
tiff had been convicted of stealing as prima facie proof of the defense of
truth. In 1932 the court of appeals, relying on Maybee, reiterated this
reasoning in Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co.8 There, plaintiff brought suit on an
insurance policy to recover for loss by fire. The insurance company pleaded,
as a defense, the insured's prior conviction for filing a false and fraudulent
statement of loss.9 The court held such evidence to be admissible as prima facie
1. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951); 130 A.L.R. 690 (1941); 80 A.L.R. 1145 (1932);
31 A.L.R. 261 (1921).
2. Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
But see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Anderson, 200 Va. 385, 105 S.E.2d 869 (1958). New
York at one time considered the prospect of adopting the Virginia rule but the legislature
decided that to admit the conviction as prima facie proof of the facts was the better rule.
N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. Rep. 391 (1939).
3. 18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1289 (1951); Annot., 31 A.L.R. 261, 275 (1921).
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958). See also Model Code of Evidence rule 521
(1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 63(20) (1953).
5. Bush, Criminal Convictions as Evidence in Civil Proceedings, 29 Miss. L.J. 276 (1958);
Cowen, The Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil Proceedings, 40
Calif. L. Rev. 225 (1952); Note, 17 Cornell L.Q. 493 (1932). Contra, Note, 27 Ill. L. Rev.
195 (1932).
6. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrara, 277 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960); Rosenberger v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959); Elliot v. A. J. Smith
Contracting Co., 358 Mich. 398, 100 N.W.2d 257 (1960).
7. 18 Johns. R. 352 (N.Y. 1820); accord, Greenberg v. Winchell, 136 N.Y.S.2d 877
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
8. 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
9. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1202 (misdemeanor conviction after trial).
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proof of the facts. Six years later, the court, in Matter of Rcchtschaffen,10 ex-
tended the Schindler rule, admitting proof that a husband had been adjudged
to be a disorderly person by reason of having abandoned his wife." This was
evidence of a judgment, penal in nature as distinguished from a conviction
of a crime,' 2 offered by petitioner to prevent issuance of letters of administra-
ion to cross-petitioner, the husband.1 3
The Schindler and Rechtschaffen cases are authorities for admitting prior
criminal convictions and judgments penal in nature as prima facie evidence
when used defensively against the wrongdoer who is seeking affirmative relief
in a civil action. The court of appeals, however, has never been faced with
the question of whether a prior criminal conviction is admissible as prima facie
proof of the plaintiff's cause of action. 14 For want of a definitive answer from
the court of appeals there have been conflicting opinions written by the lower
New York courts.
First Department
In Walther v. News Syndicate Co."; the plaintiff offered in evidence the con-
viction of the defendant's servant, obtained after a trial for a traffic infrac-
tion,'0 as part of the proof required to recover from defendant under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The court excluded the evidence, distinguish-
ing Schindler and Rechtschaffen on the ground that the evidence there was
offered defensively and not to establish the plaintiff's cause of action. But the
court also emphasized the fact that it was here dealing with a conviction for
a traffic infraction rather than a criminal conviction as in Schindlcr.'7 The
Walther court was careful to note "the narrow scope" of its decision, holding
only that the servant's conviction was inadmissible in a civil action to estab-
lish the plaintiff's cause of action against the master.18 The court posed and
left unanswered two questions. First, is a defendant's guilty plea to a traffic
violation admissible as an admission to support a cause of action in a civil
10. 278 N.Y. 336, 16 N.E.2d 357 (1938).
11. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 899(1).
12. Adjudication of a "disorderly person" under N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § S99(1)
is not a criminal conviction because the violation is neither a misdemeanor nor a felony.
People v. Phillips, 284 N.Y. 235, 30 N.E.2d 483 (1940).
13. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § S7(c) provides that no distributive Are of the etate of
a decedent shall be allowed "to a husband who has neglected or refused to provide for
his wife, or has abandoned her."
14. Ando v. Woodberry, S N.Y.2d 165, 16S N.E2d 520, 203 N.Y.S2d 74 (19CO) held a
conviction on a plea of guilty for a traffic infraction admissible as an admuiton in a
subsequent civil action.
15. 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1949).
16. N.Y. City Traffic Reg. art. I, § 20. A caveat to keep in mind is that some trafflc
violations are misdemeanors and hence crimes, e.g., N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1190,
1192, while others are not crimes, but rather, are termed traffic infractions. See N.Y.
Vehicle & Traffic Law § 155.
17. It is submitted that the conviction in Walther, under N.Y. City Traffic Reg. art. MI,
§ 20 although not a crime, is analogous to the conviction in Rechtschaffen. See note 12 supra.
18. 276 App. Div. 169, 175-76, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537, 544 (1st Dep't 1949).
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proceeding? This was answered by the court of appeals in Ando v. Wood-
berry,19 where the evidence was held admissible. Second, should proof of
conviction after trial of a crime, as distinguished from a traffic infraction,
be admissible as prima facie proof against the defendant in a later civil action?
This was answered in the affirmative by the first department in Sims v. Union
News Co. 20 Sims extended Schindler to allow evidence of a prior conviction
of a crime as affirmative prima facie proof against the employer of the convicted
party.21
Thus the first department has limited Schindler only insofar as Walther has
held a conviction after trial for a traffic infraction inadmissible as affirmative
evidence. The Walther court in "the absence of controlling authority" felt itself
free to determine the question on principle. The court reasoned that the rule
of public policy declared in Section 335 of the Civil Practice Act2 2 and the
inferior probative value of traffic court convictions were persuasive reasons
for excluding such evidence. Yet, in Ando v. Woodberry23 a majority rejected
both arguments stating that section 335 relates only to the impeachment of a
witness and not to the probative value of a prior conviction for a traffic viola-
tion, and that the inferior probative value of traffic convictions is a considera-
tion which goes to the weight but not to the admissibility of the evidence.
It is true, however, that Ando dealt with a traffic conviction after a plea of
guilty, as opposed to a conviction after trial, and that the Ando court ex-
pressly stated that the specific issue involved in Walther had yet to come
before it.2. Nevertheless, it would seem that Ando, by clearly rejecting the
reasoning upon which Walther was decided, has effectively destroyed its
authority.
Second Department
The second department, despite some of its earlier decisions, has been less
hesitant to extend the Schindler rule. Shortly after Schindler was decided,
the second department, in Roach v. Yonkers R.R.,25 denied plaintiff the affirma-
19. 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960). The conviction was for
violations of N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law §§ 1160, 1162 (traffic infraction).
20. 284 App. Div. 335, 131 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dep't 1954).
21. Accord, People v. Minuse, 273 App. Div. 457, 459, 78 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (1st Dep't
1948) (dictum) (a conviction in the federal court for conspiracy to violate the federal
"blue sky" law held admissible as affirmative prima fade evidence of conspiracy In an
action by the attorney general of the state to enjoin same).
22. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 355 provides that no witness shall be required "to disclose
a conviction for a traffic infraction, ...nor shall conviction therefor affect the credibility
of such witness in any action or proceeding." This section has been interpreted as legisla-
tive recognition of the weakness of traffic infractions as proof of the facts involved.
Hart v. Mealey, 287 N.Y. 39, 38 N.E.2d 121 (1941). But see Ando v. Woodberry, 8
N.Y.2d 165, 168, 168 N.E.2d 520, 522, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74, 77 (1960), where this section was
clearly construed to apply solely to the credibility of witnesses.
23. 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960).
24. Id. at 170, 168 N.E.2d at 523, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
25. 242 App. Div. 195, 271 N.Y. Supp. 289 (2d Dep't 1934).
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tive use of a criminal conviction. Roach was followed by Max v. Broohhavcn
Dev. Corp.2 6 There, evidence of a, traffic conviction after a plea of guilty was
affirmatively offered. This should have been allowed in evidence under the
doctrine of admissions, but the court nevertheless felt itself bound by the
reasoning of the Roach case and rejected the evidence. In Gicsslcr v. Accurate
Brass Co.,2r however, the second department did an abrupt about-face and
allowed the defendant's criminal conviction after trial for carring on a nui-
sance2 8 as prima facie proof in an action to enjoin the nuisance and for dam-
ages. The court expressly overruled the Roach case insofar as it conflicted with
Rechtschaffen. The extension was reaffirmed in the 1960 decision of Uzcns.i v.
Fitzsimmons.P
Third Department
In Barnum v. Morresey,30 to prove defendant's negligence, the plaintiff at-
tempted to elicit from a witness the fact that the defendant was convicted,
on a plea of guilty, for a traffic violation.3 ' The court, citing no authority, held
the evidence admissible as an admission. In a later case, Stanton v. Major, -
it appeared that the defendant, after conviction on a plea of guilty to a traffic
violation,33 was sued for civil damages arising from the accident. The plain-
tiff submitted a certified copy of the defendant's conviction as evidence of
negligence. The court held that the conviction was properly introduced as prima
facie evidence of the facts involved. It is significant to note that in Stanton,
just as in Barnum, the conviction was admissible as an admission. The case,
however, was appealed on the allegedly erroneous charge to the jury that "it
might consider the record and plea as prima facie evidence of negligence.' 3
Again without citation of authority, the third department found the charge to
be a correct statement of the law. Since the admission rule adequately ex-
plains the Stanton decision, it would appear that the case does not, and was not,
intended to express any opinion concerning the Schindlcr doctrine.
26. 262 App. Div. 907, 23 N.Y.S.2d 345 (2d Dep't 1941) (memorandum deciston).
27. 271 App. Div. 930, 63 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1947) (memorandum decizion);
accord, Silverman v. Abraham, 22 Mlisc. 2d 707, 193 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 19CO) (an
assault conviction after a plea of guilty admissible as affirmative prima facie proof of
plaintiff's cause of action); Delarco v. Young, 192 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. CL 1959) (a
misdemeanor traffic conviction after trial admissible as affirmative prima fade proof of
plaintiff's cause of action); Smith v. Ainissale, 190 Msc. 114, 75 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (not clear whether misdemeanor traffic conviction was after trial or was based
on plea of guilty, but conviction held admissible as affirmative prima fade proof of plain-
tiff's cause of action); Alders v. Grow, 75 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (an aault
conviction after trial admissible as affirmative prima fade proof of plaintiff's caue of
action).
28. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1532 (misdemeanor).
29. 10 App. Div. 2d 390, 201 N.Y.S.2d 353 (2d Dep't 1960) (memorandum decision).
30. 245 App. Div. 793, 2S0 N.Y. Supp. 899 (3d Dep't 1935) (memorandum decision).
31. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 (misdemeanor).
32. 274 App. Div. 364, 32 N.Y.S.2d 134 (3d Dep't 1943) (memorandum decision).
33. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1190 (misdemeanor).
34. 274 App. Div. S64, 32 N.Y.S.2d 135 (3d Dep't 1943) (memorandum decision).
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Two trial term supreme court decisions in the third department also dealt
with the problem. In Loeper v. Roberts,85 the plaintiff offered the defendant's
conviction of a traffic infraction36 as affirmative proof of his negligence. The
court, citing no authority, held the evidence inadmissible. The opinion does
not reveal whether the conviction was after trial or on a plea of guilty. If the
conviction was on a plea of guilty, the case is overruled by Ando v. Wood-
berry,37 but if the conviction was after trial it parallels Walther v. News Syn-
dicate Co.,38 which is itself weakened by Ando. In McDowell v. Birchett"
the court accepted the defendant's traffic conviction on a plea of guilty as
prima facie proof of negligence. The court disposed of the issue with the brief
statement that "such negligence is prima facie established by the defendant's
conviction .... -40 It made no mention of the admission theory.
Fourth Department
In Everdyke v. Esley,4' the Schindler decision was followed to permit proof
of plaintiff's criminal conviction for defensive purposes. In Glaiser v. Troano-
vitch,42 the plaintiff attempted to establish defendant's negligence under the
doctrine of respondeat superior using the conviction, on a plea of guilty, of
defendant's servant for violating a labor statute.43 The court excluded the evi-
dence as an admission of a servant not binding on the defendant master be-
cause it was not part of the res gestae.44 The court did not go into the
question whether the Schindler doctrine could be extended to affirmative use.
In Same v. Davison,45 the fourth department approved the admission of evi-
dence of a criminal conviction46 after a guilty plea to establish affirmatively
defendant's negligence. The court, however, reversed on other grounds leaving
the pronouncement on the admissibility of such evidence a dictum. 47 Again,
because the conviction was on a plea of guilty, the case admits of the possibility
35. 199 Misc. 1095, 106 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
36. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 511 (misdemeanor).
37. 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960).
38. 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1949).
39. 126 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
40. Id. at 79.
41. 258 App. Div. 843, 15 N.Y.S.2d 666 (4th Dep't 1939) (memorandum decision).
42. 264 App. Div. 940, 36 N.Y.S.2d 281 (4th Dep't 1942) (memorandum decision).
43. N.Y. Labor Law § 167 (misdemeanor).
44. See Molino v. City of New York, 195 App. Div. 496, 186 N.Y. Supp. 742 (1st
Dep't 1921); Vadney v. United Traction Co., 188 App. Div. 365, 177 N.Y. Supp. 114
(3d Dep't 1919).
45. 253 App. Div. 123, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (4th Dep't 1937) (per curiam) (dictum).
46. Id. at 124, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
47. See Merkling v. Ford Motor Co., 251 App. Div. 89, 96, 296 N.Y. Supp. 393, 402
(4th Dep't 1937). In a dictum the court said that a conviction for a violation of a traffic
ordinance "is no proof of liability" in a civil action on the same event and thus Is In-
admissible. But this court relied on Roach v. Yonkers R.R., 242 App. Div. 195, 271 N.Y.
Supp. 289 (2d Dep't 1934) which was later overruled. See note 27 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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that the evidence was allowed because it constituted an admission. Yet the court,
citing Schindler and apparently to avoid making the guilty plea decisive, stated
that the evidence was "'prina facie evidence of the facts involved."'49 This
would appear to indicate approval of such evidence when used affirmatively.
IAjoRITY RuLE v. NEw YoRx RuLF
The reasons traditionally advanced in support of the majority rule of ex-
clusion are:
1. The parties to a criminal action differ from the parties to a civil action;4 9
the State or People prosecute the criminal action while the person whose right
or rights have been violated maintains the civil action. On the other hand,
proponents of the New York rule argue that, despite the difference in the
parties to the two actions, the defendant has had in the criminal prosecution
every opportunity, including appeal, to defeat the case against him.
2. The criminal proceeding is brought to vindicate a public right and the
civil action determines private rights and liabilities. ° Yet, where a criminal
violation rests on interference with a private right does not the conclusion
that the accused is guilty necessarily include a finding that a private right has
been transgressed? To say that the conviction is not proof of the infringement
upon the private right would seem to conclude that the conviction is not proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. The varying degrees and elements of proof in the two trials forbid allow-
ing the criminal conviction to be decisive of the facts in the civil actionP't It is
indeed surprising to find this reason offered to support exclusion. If the evi-
dence exposes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, can there
be any doubt that there is prima fade proof of liability by a preponderance of
the evidence? It is axiomatic that the greater includes the lesser.
4. The admissibility of such prior criminal convictions as evidence is a viola-
tion of both the hearsay rule and the opinion rule since the finding of the jury
or judge is obviously nothing more than a conclusion from the testimony pro-
duced at trial.," But the hearsay difficulty is overcome when it is recalled that
the only cogent basis for the hearsay rule is the impossibility of cross-examina-
tion to determine what weight, if any, should be given to the testimony. Yet,
the party against whom the conviction is offered was present at the criminal
trial and was confronted by the witnesses against him, with the right to cross-
examine them.53 As to the opinion rule objection: it may be that the con-
viction represents the opinion of the judge or jury, but is it not a reliable and
trustworthy opinion formed by those acting under a duty imposed by law?*4
48. 253 App. Div. 123, 124, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375.
49. Myers v. Maryland Cas. Co., 123 Mo. App. 6S2, 101 S.W. 124 (1907).
50. Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Villiamson, 91 W. Va. 196, 112 S.E. 301 (1922).
51. Ibid.
52. Note, 27 EL. L. Rev. 195, 197 (1932).
53. Note, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 243-44 (1927).
54. Ibid.
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Furthermore, is it not a common practice to allow as evidence the findings of
those required by law to make official investigations?5 5
5. Two arguments may be classified as practical considerations. One proposes
that admissibility of a prior criminal conviction would unnecessarily extend
the duration of the civil trial because the convicted person must be accorded
an opportunity to explain the circumstances of his conviction in an effort to
rebut the evidence. Against this consideration should be weighed the usually
high probative value of such evidence 0 and the possibility that it may be the
only evidence available. The other argument urges against admissibility be-
cause of the fear that the jury will be unduly prejudiced and will be unable
to weigh objectively the value of such proof. To this contention Judge Fuld,
in Ando v. Woodberry,57 answered:
To the claim that the jury will be unduly prejudiced by the introduction of a plea
of guilt [or of a criminal conviction] despite the opportunity to explain it away, we
content ourselves with the statement that this underestimates the intelligence of
jurors and overlooks their awareness of those very circumstances said to destroy
the meaning and significance of the plea [or conviction].58
CONCLUSION
The New York rule that a prior conviction is admissible as prima facie proof
in a subsequent civil proceeding based on the same facts has found varied ap-
plication in the lower courts. The first department has held a prior traffic
conviction after trial inadmissible as affirmative proof in a subsequent civil
action. The second department has held a prior criminal conviction after trial
admissible as prima facie proof regardless of how it is used. The third department
has never had occasion to hold a prior conviction after trial admissible as
affirmative prima facie proof, while the fourth department has held a prior
conviction after trial admissible as prima facie proof but only when used de-
fensively. The conflict has resulted because the courts have narrowly construed
the Schindler rule and have limited its application to the defensive use of the
evidence. Logic dictates that if proffered evidence has probative value it mat-
ters not whether it be offered by the defendant to support his defense or by
the plaintiff to support a cause of action. Until we have a more authoritative
decision by the court of appeals it would appear more reasonable to apply
the Schindler rule liberally.
55. An example of this is a lunacy inquisition. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 568 (1920). See also
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 1346 at 1019 (2d ed. 1923), where the noted authority claims the
problem is not one of evidence but rather of "lending of the [other] Court's executive aid,
on certain terms, to a claimant or a defendant, without investigation of the merits of
fact."
56. Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922-Evidence (pt. 2), 35 Harv. L. Rev.
428, 440 (1922).
57. 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960).
58. Id. at 171, 168 N.E.2d at 524, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
